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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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No Change in Class. ☐

☐ Declassified

Class. Changed to: TS S

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From: 7 September 1950

To : 13 September 1950

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Department of the Army

Washington 25, D. C.

14 September 1950

No. 6

JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. There are no indications of imminent Soviet hostilities.
- b. There are no firm indications of Soviet or Chinese Communist intentions to intervene overtly in Korea, and there are no indications of an imminent attack on Formosa.
- c. Viet Minh preparations for an offensive continue but there were no firm indications noted during this period as to when it will be launched.
- d. A renewed threat to Berlin is possible following the October elections in East Germany but there are no definite indications that such action is planned.
- e. Available information on military construction and stockpiling in Eastern Europe and on Communist Party worldwide preparations provides no clear indications of a timetable for military or subversive action in the near future, but does indicate an accelerated preparedness program.

2. SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. KOREA.—See current situation reports. Transfer of Korean elements serving with the Chinese Communist Field Forces to North Korea probably continues, but there are no reliable indications that the Chinese Communists plan to intervene overtly in the Korean conflict.
- b. CHINA.—Military construction activity continues on the coast opposite Formosa but there are no indications of an imminent attack.

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- c. **INDO-CHINA.**—There is no new information indicative of Chinese Communist intentions to invade. Preparations for a Viet Minh offensive are continuing but present road and rail construction to the Indo-China border will probably not be completed for several months. The last factor may not necessarily deter the launching of a Viet Minh offensive.
 - d. **GERMANY.**—There are indications that East German Alert Police units are preparing to assume certain military functions, probably following the 15 October elections. The establishment of a permanent government in the East Zone will permit any action against West Berlin to be represented as entirely a German affair but there are no indications of an immediate threat to Berlin.
 - e. **CZECHOSLOVAKIA.**—[] reports indicate that Czech industry is being converted to war production to be concentrated on supplying military items for the U.S.S.R. There are similar indications of increasing heavy production at the expense of consumer goods in other Eastern European countries.
 - f. **IRAN.**—The recent Kurdish tribal incident was apparently of negligible importance and a purely local development.
 - g. **EASTERN EUROPE.**—Although some military construction activity in Eastern Europe is scheduled for completion this month and stockpiles of military items have been increased, there are no firm indications that construction and logistical preparations generally have been timed for completion this autumn. There are no reports of significant recent military activity other than maneuvers.
 - h. **COMMUNIST PARTIES.**—There is little additional information to indicate that Communist Party plans call for widescale sabotage or intensified subversive action in the immediate future.
3. **COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES.**—No significant change is evident during the period but an accelerated military preparedness program is generally increasing capabilities in all areas.

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TAB "A"

REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS**Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
13 September 1950****1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.**

a. There are no reliable indications that the Chinese Communists contemplate an active participation in the Korean war, but the transfer of Korean elements serving with the Chinese Communist Field Forces to North Korea continues. There are no confirmed reports of the movement of additional Fourth Field Army troops to Manchuria, but a report of 1 September has indicated a possible further movement of troops and equipment northward from Hankow. The Chinese Communist 55th, 56th and 57th Armies, which have been reported on the Manchurian-Korean border, are believed to be troops which have been stationed in Manchuria for some time rather than recent reinforcements from outside the area.

b. There are no indications of an imminent attack on Formosa, but there are continuing reports of airfield improvements, road construction and other military preparations on the Fukien and Chekiang coast opposite Formosa. Reports of the movement of troops southward from Fukien and of the arrival of elements of the Third Field Army in the Canton area are as yet unconfirmed. Alleged Communist preparations for an attack on Tachen (two small islands off the Chekiang coast) are not confirmed, and such action itself would not be indicative of an imminent attack on Formosa.

c. As a result of the reduction of British forces in Hong Kong, the Chinese Communists hold a clear superiority in military strength in the area. There were no indications noted during this period, however, that the Communists plan an overt move against the Colony in the near future and such a move is unlikely so long as the free port facilities and other advantages of Hong Kong continue to be essential to the Chinese Communists.

d. There is no new information indicative of Chinese Communist intentions to invade Indo-China, although the Chinese Communists have the capability to do so at any time without appreciable warning and without jeopardizing possible simultaneous operations in other areas. Preparations for a Viet Minh offensive, utilizing integrated Chinese Communist personnel, appear to be continuing. The existence of large numbers of irregular groups (perhaps 60,000 to 70,000) in the general border region would make overt Chinese Communist participation in the initial stages of a Viet Minh offensive in Tonkin difficult to detect. Despite rumors that the Viet Minh offensive will be launched this fall with the end of the rainy season, there are no completely reliable indications of this.

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The timetable may in part be determined by the progress made on construction of rail and highway facilities from China to the Indo-China border. Recent reports indicate that the Chinese Communists have given a top priority to the completion of the rail line from Lanchow to the Indo-China border near Langson and plan to complete it by the end of 1950. A highway from Yunnan to the border near Lachay is reportedly scheduled for completion in September. It is believed, however, that neither of these projects will be completed for several months.

e. Fragmentary reports of internal Chinese Communist problems suggest that Communist military forces are becoming increasingly preoccupied with internal duties. There are indications of increasing food shortages, flood control problems in central China, and widespread banditry in western and southwestern China. It is possible that these problems will be a deterrent to extensive military undertakings in the near future.

f. Negotiations for a settlement of the Sino-Tibetan problem are now in progress in New Delhi. There are no new indications of a Chinese Communist intention to invade Tibet, but the military threat strengthens the Chinese position in these negotiations.

g. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) There are currently no firm indications of a Chinese Communist intention to intervene in Korea.
- (2) Available information does not indicate an imminent attack on Formosa.
- (3) Preparations for a Viet Minh offensive continue, but there are no firm indications of when it will be launched and there are no new indications of a Chinese Communist intention to invade.

2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. There have been few indications of significant military activity in Europe. In Germany, it is reported that relatively large-scale exercises by Soviet forces may have started during August. Division-scale maneuvers of the Bulgarian Army took place during August, about three weeks earlier than last year, and, based on reported movements of divisions to maneuver areas, it is believed that army-scale maneuvers commenced in August and that these exercises involve more units and are more thorough than last year. There have been no reports of large-scale maneuver activity in other countries.

b. Some further tightening of security has occurred in Poland where restrictions on the activities of Western military attaches have been increased.

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c. On a field trip to the Transcaucasus area, the U. S. Assistant Army Attache to Moscow observed no evidence of organized military movements or other unusual activity. The headquarters of the Transcaucasus Military District at Tbilisi (Tiflis) appeared quiet. Progress was observed on improvement of the military highway in Georgia which has been passable nine months a year and is expected to be open for year-round traffic this autumn.

d. The tribal incident in Iran, reported last week, appears to have been of little importance, and there are reliable indications that it was only a local development. The incident has pointed out the continuing possibility of Kurdish disturbances in other countries of the Near East.

e. Available information with respect to Soviet plans in Germany does not indicate a probability of a major crisis in the immediate future, but the U.S.S.R. is preparing to implement long-range plans and a renewed threat to Berlin is possible following the 15 October East German elections.

- (1) As the elections are intended to establish a permanent government which can claim to represent all Germany, the Soviets may well accompany this development by some announcement of recognition of the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, termination of the state of war with Germany, or even the negotiation of a separate peace treaty. Such a move would be consistent with present Soviet and East German propaganda. Despite rumors that the Soviets are preparing to withdraw their troops from Germany, there are no military indications that they contemplate such a move in the near future.
- (2) There are already indications that East German officials are assuming the prerogative of issuing visas. With the establishment of a permanent East German Government the Soviets will be in a position to force the Western powers to deal directly with East German officials, particularly in Berlin, and to deny responsibility for action by German authorities. A renewed attempt to seize West Berlin could thus be represented as a purely German affair. There are no clear indications that such an attempt will be made in the near future, however, although there has been sporadic propaganda against alleged illicit Western air activities over the Soviet Zone.
- (3) East German police activity indicates that the Alert Police are preparing to assume certain military functions in the Zone. There have been recent reports

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that Alert Police units are undergoing combined training with Soviet units. In September or October, the Alert Police are scheduled to complete their present training activities, and it is expected that the organization will assume operational functions, either as an internal security force or possibly as a regular army. In any case, the capabilities of this force are increasing.

- (4) The present propaganda campaign demanding the withdrawal of Western troops from Germany will probably be intensified.
- (5) In addition to the program announced at the recent National Front Congress to harass West Germany by strikes, current Communist plans call for a Free German Youth demonstration at Dortmund in the British Zone on 30 September - 1 October. Although it has been announced that the rally will be banned by force of arms if necessary, some outbreak of violence is possible.

f. A series of reports from Czechoslovakia during the past several months have established that Czech industry is being converted to war production. These reports indicate that Czech industrial leaders were ordered in January 1950 to convert to war production within four months; that four automobile motor plants were subsequently ordered to decrease output of automobiles and convert to production of tank engines; that the U.S.S.R. ordered the Czech armament industries to concentrate on tank parts, large caliber gun parts, small arms, locomotives and freight cars, telephones, radios, and spare parts; and that Czechoslovakia was ordered to cease all further development on design of weapons and war material of its own and to concentrate on supplying items to the U.S.S.R. There are also indications that women are being increasingly utilized in such activity as postal delivery in order to free men for heavy production work. As Czechoslovakia is the most important industrially of the Satellites, this conversion is a significant indication of increasing war production in the Soviet orbit. It is too early, however, to determine the extent to which Czech industry is now producing war materials. There have been similar indications of increasing emphasis on heavy production at the expense of consumer goods in other of the European Satellites, particularly in Poland, although there is less reliable evidence available on the extent of war conversion in the other countries.

g. In the report of this Committee dated 27 July and in subsequent reports, various indications of possible Soviet planning for additional political, subversive or military action in the autumn of 1950 were discussed. These indications had consisted primarily of military construction and logistical preparations in Europe and reports of Communist Party planning for intensified action during the autumn. A review of available information on these subjects now indicates the following:

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- (1) Military construction activity in Europe, particularly of airfields, and an apparently enlarged military stockpiling program have undoubtedly increased capabilities for offensive operations. There are no firm indications, however, that construction activity and logistical preparations in Europe generally are timed for completion by a specified date this autumn, and there has been little recent information which suggests that significant military preparations are being made in any area of Eastern Europe. There are indications that barracks and other construction is continuing without undue haste, and there has been almost no evidence that railroad and highway improvements are being rushed to completion. Tension in Europe, particularly in the Balkans, has decreased considerably in recent weeks.
- (2) There has been little additional information to indicate that Communist Parties are preparing for increased sabotage or intensified worldwide subversive operations in the near future, although there are some indications of increased planning for such action. A recent report of French Communist Party plans indicates that the Party will concentrate on increasing worker dissatisfaction in order to cause work stoppages this fall, and will continue propaganda to create distrust of "American imperialism" in Europe and to foster French receptiveness to "neutrality" and the "peace-loving aims" of the U.S.S.R. At the same time, highly trusted members are to receive training in techniques of sabotage and rioting for direct action at a later date.

h. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) There are no conclusive indications of imminent Soviet hostilities in Western Europe, the Balkans or the Near East. An attack in any of these areas could occur without additional warning.
- (2) Soviet activity in East Germany gives no indications of an immediate crisis preparatory to the October "elections," but propaganda preparations are being made for an announced claim that the newly elected East German Government would be representative of all Germany.


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- (3) Preparations of the past several months have increased Soviet capabilities for military action but do not appear to indicate a timetable for completion of military preparations by a specified date in the near future. Plant conversion, military construction activities, and increased military stockpiles do indicate an accelerated preparedness program.


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